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A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH: THE 
APPLICATIONS TO COUNTER-TERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE. 
 
This article will attempt to contribute to and advance the growing literature on social 
network analysis and terrorism studies, through a social network analysis of the 
Jemaah Islamiyah cell that was responsible for the Bali bombings in 2002. In doing 
so, the article will endeavour to provide a potential framework for the intelligence 
analysis of terrorist cells. Such a framework will assist in firstly understanding the 
communication and structure of such cells and secondly assist in predicting the likely 
outcomes of terrorist cells when employed in real-time intelligence analysis. 
 
1. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
There is an area within the social sciences which aims at understanding exactly how 
groups of individuals operate and consequentially, how they behave. This area is 
social network analysis, a methodological form of analysis that fuses mathematics, 
anthropology, psychology, and sociology. A ‘Social Network’ can be defined as “a 
finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations defined on them”,1 where 
individuals are reduced to nodes, and their relationship to links (or lines). Therefore, 
social network analysis is “a mathematical method for ‘connecting the dots’…[and] 
allows us to map and measure complex, sometimes covert, human groups and 
organization”,2 the method focuses on uncovering the patterning of people’s 
interaction,3 and correctly interpreting these networks assists “in predicting behaviour 
and decision-making within the network”.4 Furthermore, the “ability to understand 
and predict behaviour of members in a social network allows the analyst to evaluate 
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specific courses of action that will influence the members of a social network in a 
desirable manner”.5 Steven Aftergood, of the Federation of American Scientists, 
claims that social network analysis “provides a useful way of structuring knowledge 
and framing further research. Ideally it can also enhance an analyst’s predictive 
capability”.6 This article will briefly discuss the development of social network 
analysis within the intelligence and counter-terrorism fields, and present a framework 
for the analysis of small-scale terrorist networks (cells) through the analysis of the 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) cell that operated in Bali, Indonesia, in 2002. This paper has 
been approached through an Australian perspective, and has thus chosen to examine 
JI through social network analysis due to the group’s clear and present threat to 
Australian assets, institutions, and citizens in South East Asia. The cell that conducted 
the 2002 Bali bombing was selected because it represents the largest and most 
coordinated attack that the group had undertaken to date. 
 
1.2 INTELLIGENCE & COUNTER-TERRORISM APPLICATIONS 
There has been an abundance of social network analysis research into crime, 
intelligence, and criminal networks, largely stimulated by Sparrow’s7 work on the 
application of network analysis techniques to intelligence analysis, which focused on 
the identification of network vulnerabilities within the different types and forms of 
criminal networks. Sparrow asserted that intelligence agencies have remained largely 
unsophisticated in their use of analytical concepts and frameworks, stating that social 
network analysis has a lot to offer intelligence agencies in this area through its ability 
to discover who is central within organizations, which individual’s removal would 
most effectively disrupt the network, what role individuals are playing, and which 
relationships are vital to monitor.8 Despite these important applications, Sparrow 
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claimed there was little research overlapping the two fields. Sparrow exhibits three 
contentions within his paper, the first is the pertinent application of social network 
analysis to intelligence analysis, the second is that there is significant opportunity 
within the field for adapting network analysis to the intelligence field, and finally, 
that such a collaboration would be extremely beneficial to both fields.9 
 
Sparrow discussed the vital characteristics of covert or criminal networks that 
separate them from overt networks. These were: ‘Size’, which noted the networks 
may be extremely large, spanning thousands of nodes; ‘Incompleteness’, which 
details that the nature of covert cells entails that some links within the network will be 
missed by intelligence gathering methods; ‘Fuzzy Boundaries’, implies that the 
borders of any covert network will be unclear, with individuals belonging to different 
groups and different networks and; ‘Dynamic’, meaning that the network is 
constantly moving and changing, rarely static, with the interactions between 
individuals strengthening and weakening over time.10  
 
Since sparrow there have been several attempts at examining criminal and covert 
networks within the social network analysis literature, such as Baker and Faulkner’s 
study of illegal networks within the heavy electrical equipment industry,11 Klerks’ 
study on varying criminal organizations and the approaches to examining these 
networks, and Deckro and Renfro’s social network analysis of the Iranian 
Government.12 Despite the application of social network analysis to military, crime, 
and criminal networks areas, as well as the dire necessity to gain the some ability to 
predict terrorism and understand how these groups operate, little research into social 
network analysis has been undertaken within the terrorism studies field. This lack of 
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application is indicative of criticisms of terrorism studies raised by Silke,13 and 
Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg,14 which aim at the lack of empirical, quantitative, and 
substantive analysis within the field. Ultimately, this deficiency results in a scarcity 
of explanative and predictive studies. 
 
Of the literature that does exist, Arquilla and Ronfeldt were among the first to take up 
the challenge. Arquilla and Ronfeldt15 in a book entitled Networks and Netwars: The 
Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, synthesised previous work, the sum of which 
introduced and developed the concept of ‘Netwar’i and its applications to terrorism, 
crime, and militancy. The authors assessed that “the field of network analysis, writ 
large, has been dominated by social network analysis, but organizational network 
analysis can be even more helpful for understanding the nature of netwar”,16 then 
moving to shape a framework of ‘Organizational Network Analysis’. This framework 
comprises five levels: the organizational level, the narrative level, the doctrinal level, 
the technological level, and the social level.17 The organizational network analysis 
framework differs from social network analysis in that it does not employ the use of 
robust empirical methods and mathematics to measure the values of the network, but 
rather focuses on criteria such as the strategies and methods employed, and the 
information systems used in the network. Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s work provided an 
important framework for the analysis into the networks of terrorist cells and groups. 
Despite the important research and attempted development of the network analysis 
area, this study failed to literally apply their theoretical approaches to terrorist or 
covert groups using any form of sociometric, organizational analysis, or graph theory. 
 
                                                 
i Refers to conflict and crime in which the subjects are organised as networks without leaders, as 
oppose to hierarchical networks. 
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Within this sparse area of literature, there have been important applications between 
the fields of social network analysis and terrorism studies that have expanded the 
integration and cohesion between the two fields. Works such as Carley, Reminga, and 
Kamneva’s18 study examining the forms of disruption and destabilization applicable 
to dynamic and covert networks, and Tsvetovat and Carley’s study focusing on the 
success of such destabilization techniques in structurally equivalent networks, are 
examples of work that theoretically apply social network analysis to covert and 
terrorist organizations.19  Another significant application is Van Meter’s examination 
of the varying forms of link and network analysis that have been employed by 
intelligence agencies in the analysis of covert networks. Van Meter promoted the 
integration or at least acknowledgement of academia’s potential applications to the 
‘closed’ area of intelligence.20 While these applications have contributed to the 
development and coordination of social network analysis and terrorism studies, there 
has been a succinct lack of substantive application of social network analysis to 
specific existing or historical cells within the area. 
 
The only such social network analysis of terrorism which has applied graph theory, 
network and sociogramatical analysis to a non-fictional cellii is Valdis Krebs’21 
analysis of the September 11 al-Qaeda cell. Through this study, Krebs has offered the 
most profound social network analysis to date of a terrorist organization, in that it 
applied a substantive framework to a real terrorist cell, moving from the previous 
studies which focused their studies on theoretical cells. The significance of this study 
is verified through work undertaken by Vos Fellman and Wright22 and Farley,23 the 
latter summarising these substantive applications as necessary in that academic 
                                                 
ii All essential elements of social network analysis. 
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methods must aim at the assistance of law enforcement and intelligence agencies in 
the war on terror. 
 
Since the work of Krebs, there has been a small number other studies that attempt 
to map terrorist networks and cells. Carley, Dombroski, Tsvetovat, Reminga, and 
Kamneva in 2003 examined an al-Qaeda network that undertook an embassy 
bombing in Tunisia, and examined destabilization techniques of this network.24 In 
a 2005 study, Carley mapped the communication and interaction within a 2002 al-
Qaeda network, through dynamic network analysis,25 in the same year, Carley, 
Diesner, Reminga, and Tsvetovat also examined a terrorist network in the Middle-
East through dynamic network analysis.26 Despite these works, there still exists 
little literature in which substantive historical terrorist cells have been mapped and 
examined through either social network or other forms of network analysis. 
 
It has been established that there has been very little application of social network 
analysis to real terrorist groups. Despite the potentially profound significance of 
sociogramatical and social network analysis to terrorism studies, there are only a 
small handful of substantive studies that employ such analysis. It has been established 
that social network analysis is a powerful tool capable of providing a predictive and 
explanatory value to the field of terrorism studies, and hence, provide the beginnings 
of an essential capability to terrorism studies, and its integration into real world 
intelligence analysis.iii 
 
2. AN ANALYST’S FRAMEWORK 
                                                 
iii The significance of such research is evidenced by the amount of further research drawn from Krebs’ 
(2002) study. 
 8
The framework presented in this article will bypass a significant amount of the 
applicable mathematical and social network theory, and not extend to the more 
complex operations within the social network analysis frameworks in an attempt to 
provide a basic initial framework for an intelligence analysis tool. Despite its relative 
simplicity, the framework holds true to the academic principles of social network 
analysis and sociogramatical theory. 
 
2.1 STAGE 1: CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
The first step in any attempt to analyse a social network is to construct a contextual 
background. This background must be accomplished in order to understand the 
physical environment of the network. The background should be constructed through 
a case study approach which is among the oldest of methodological traditions within 
qualitative research. While the case study and other biographical forms of analysis are 
not generally considered of great value in the search for predictive intelligence 
analysis, their value cannot be trivialised, as without a meticulous, detailed, and 
objective biographical database or background, any form of analysis will prove 
useless. The construction of the contextual background must examine all information 
on the cell at the micro- and meta-levels: the individual, the cell, and the group or 
organization. 
 
According to Scott27 there are three principal types of data within research: Attribute 
Data; Relational Data; Ideational Data. Scott maintains that the data appropriate to 
social network analysis is relational data.28 Relational data consists of the contacts, 
ties, and connections of the individuals within a network, these “relations are not the 
properties of the agents, but the systems of the agents [therefore,]…the methods 
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appropriate to relational data are those of network analysis”.29 This relational data 
must be made up of all possible data, both open sourced and classified (where 
appropriate); however, care must be taken in the collection so that objectivity remains 
paramount. Speculations and assumptions in the documentation of the interaction, 
communication, and relations between the subjects, must be avoided at all times. 
 
The contextual background of the JI Bali cell is far too extensive for presentation in 
this article; however an abbreviated version will be presented to qualify the relational 
data that was synthesised from the full contextual background.iv 
 
2.1.1 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) formed from the Darul Islam separatist movement in Indonesia 
during the 1950s. The goal of Darul Islam was the creation of an Indonesian Islamic 
state, and the movement was responsible for several uprisings through the 1950s and 
60s in Indonesia.30 While Darul Islam was suppressed and forced to operate 
underground during the mid 1960s, several armed militant organizations formed from 
the group in the mid to 1980s, one of these groups was JI. JI established radical 
Islamic boarding schools, and expanded their influence into Malaysia and throughout 
South East Asia.31  
 
JI recruits trained in Afghanistan from 1985, after being tunnelled through Makhtab 
al-Khadamat lil Mujahideen al-Arab (Afghan Services Bureau) to Camp Saddah, in 
which recruits were schooled in a three year training course that consisted of 
weapons, tactics, and explosives instruction, combined with strict salafist 
                                                 
iv All of the data presented in this article are from unclassified, open sources. 
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indoctrination.32 The last class for Afghan training of JI members arrived in 1991, 
following the Soviet withdrawal.33 The subsequent year, following a disagreement 
between JI leader Sungkar and another senior Darul Islam leader, Ajengan Masduki, 
Sungkar established JI as an organization distinct from Darul Islam.34 JI now had the 
unambiguous goal of establishing a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia.35 
 
From 2000, JI attempted to assassinate the Philippines Ambassador to Indonesia, 
detonated 38 bombs in churches across the Indonesian archipelago,36 and attempted to 
assassinate Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri.37 
   
2.1.2 2002 BALI BOMBING CELL 
In the late evening of October 6, Amrozi, Azahari, Dulmatin, Ali Imron, and Mubarok 
arrived in Bali with the L300 van that was to be used in the execution of the operation 
and (with the exception of Ali Imron) met with Samudra, Idris, Abdul Ghoni, and 
Umar Patek at the Hotel Harem in Denpasar to ensure everyone was up to speed with 
the security plan and their operational tasks. 38 Following this meeting, the group split 
up, the bomb makers, Azahari and Dulmatin left for a large rented house at 18 Pulau 
Menjangan Street, accompanied later by Ali Imron. Amrozi and Mubarok left for a 
residence on Jalon Gatot Subroto in Denpasar.39 In the Pulau Manjangan Street house, 
Ghoni, Patek, and Sarijo had already completed the mixing of the chemicals for the 
bomb experts and were to assist in the construction of the device.40 The commanders 
of the operation, Samudra (field commander) and Idris (logistics commander), stayed 
in the Muslim quarter of Denpasar behind the Banyuwangi café and food stall in Jalan 
Pulau Pinang.41 
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The support group of the operation, Team Lima, were already in place. This group 
consisted of Andi Octavia, Junaedi, Hidayat, Abdul Rauf, and Anasan, and were 
Samudra’s protégé’s who he had recruited and trained himself. 42 This group was to 
provide any necessary support for the operation, with Arnasan having already 
volunteered for martyrdom in the operation.43 Three members of this group were 
established in a small unit in a communal compound at 10 Jalan Marlboro, in the 
outskirts of Denpasar, with the other two members situated in another location.44 
 
Every member of the operation used a Balinese alias, and was addressed and 
addressed others by their aliases. They communicated using code words, referring to 
the bomb as dodol kudus, a type of Indonesian fruit cake. The main form of 
communication between each group and Samudra and Idris was SMS.45 They changed 
their numbers frequently through sim cards Idris purchased at the Intikom phone shop 
in Denpasar.46 If a call was received from an unknown number on a certain sim card, 
it would be changed immediately.47 
 
 
In the following days, the house at 18 Pulau Menjangan Street was a hive of activity, 
Ghoni, Patek, Sarijo, Azahari, and Dulmatin were constructing the Vehicle Based 
Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) to be used. Imron was also at the residence to 
assist in the construction process. The security was tight in this house, Patek and 
Sarijo did not know exactly who Azahari was, calling him ‘Alan’ or ‘Lan’. The six 
men never left the house,v and constantly had someone on guard.48 The mixed 
chemicals were packed into the plastic filing cabinet shelves that Mubarok and 
Amrozi had brought in the L300 from Tenggulun. The four drawers of each of twelve 
                                                 
v Apart from the one incident where a small amount of the explosives detonated, and the group left to 
demonstrate to inquisitive neighbours that the noise was of no significance. 
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filing cabinets were filled with the explosive mixture and TNT chargers connected by 
around 150 metres of Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate filled detonation chord. There were 
94 Cyclotrimethylene trinitramine electric detonators attached to the TNT.49 These 
filing cabinets were then positioned inside the L300. 
 
Idris and Samudra visited Amrozi and Mubarok in Jalan Gatot Subroto on several 
occasions, bringing them food.50 The pair also visited the bomb building house on a 
couple of occasions to check the status of the operation.51 
 
At some point during the operation, Muklas (JI head of operations in Singapore and 
Malaysiavi) alerted Idris via SMS that he was going to travel to Bali to visit the group 
for a period of three days. During this visit, he was subjected to the same security 
procedures as the rest of the cell, often kept in a room on his own and isolated from 
the other individuals. Idris picked him up from the bus station in Denpasar, taking him 
to a small house where he later returned with food and Amrozi. Muklas also met 
another man at this point but they did not exchange names and Muklas did not know 
him. The following night, on October 9, Muklas was taken on a surveillance run of 
the intended targets, Paddy’s Bar and the Sari Club on Kuta,52 and later (with Idris)53 
to visit the bomb construction team on Pulau Menjangan Street. Before his departure 
by bus, Muklas very briefly spoke to Ali Imron and Samudra.54  
 
October 10 was a busy day. The bomb was being loaded into the L300, and the device 
for the Paddy’s Bar bombing was being constructed by Dulmatin and Azahari. The 
Paddy’s Bar device was a vest loaded with about one kilogram of TNT. Each device 
was wired to a mobile phone to allow for the detonation by Idris from a distance.55 
                                                 
vi Mantiqi 1. 
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Samudra met with Team Lima, and Abdul Rauf, Junaedi, Andi Octavia, and Hidayat 
were instructed to return to their homes in Java. October the 10th also saw the arrival 
of Feri, a friend of Ali Imron’s from the Al-Islam school in Tenggulun who was 
recruited by Samudra to be the suicide bomber for the Paddy’s Bar bomb.56 By the 
evening of October 10, all of the devices were ready, as were all elements of the 
operation. The JI members began to leave Bali that night, and by the afternoon of the 
following day, only Samudra, Ali Imron, Idris, Arnasan, and Feri remained on Bali.57 
 
This operation was executed on October 12, 2002. Feri walked into Paddy’s Bar on 
Kuta Beach, detonating the explosives in his vest, instantly killing eight patrons. As 
patrons poured out of the surrounding nightclubs and bars to investigate, Arnasan 
detonated the 1000 kilograms of TNT and ammonium nitrate in the L300 VBIED just 
outside the Sari nightclub. The operation killed 202 people including 88 Australians. 
 
2.2 STAGE 2: RELATIONAL DATA, CODIFICATION, & VISUALIZATION 
The second stage in social network analysis concerns the storage and classification of 
the relational data collected through the above processes and data sources. The 
relational data must be codified and then stored in an adjacency matrix. The data is 
coded according to interactional criteria. These criteria include ‘Transactional 
Content’ and ‘Frequency and Duration of Interaction’.58 The transactional content 
measure concerns the exchanges between the actors that define that relationship,59 and 
are essentially the ‘substance’ of the interaction. These exchanges can be the 
exchange of information, or simply contact that concerns the operation that is under 
investigation. These interactions can be through the use of telecommunications, 
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internet, letters, and through face to face and indirect contact.vii It is the frequency and 
duration of these interactions that are measured by the second interactional criteria 
(Frequency and Duration of Contact).60 Through this criteria, these interactions are 
given a value to qualify the strength of the interactions that are occurring between the 
individuals. For the codification of the JI cell, the strength of relationship ranged from 
1 to 5 (Table 2). The recording of the interaction of the cell began following the 
meeting in the Hotel Harem in Denpasar on October 6, when the group was 
considered to go ‘operationally covert’, and concluded when the majority of the group 
had left Bali before the implementation of the operation on October 11, 2002. 
 
TABLE 1: JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH BINARY RELATIONS 
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MUKLAS 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
AMROZI 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IMRON 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
SAMUDRA 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
DULMATIN 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
IDRIS 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
MUBAROK 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AZAHARI 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
GHONI 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
ARNASAN 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
RAUF 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
OCTAVIA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
HIDAYAT 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
JUNAEDI 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
PATEK 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
FERI 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
                                                 
vii Ties such as family, religion, and friendship are considered to be dormant during the covert stage of 
an operation, as the only interactions bind individuals together are those that concern the operation. 
These are the interactions that can be tracked and monitored by counter-terrorism authorities. 
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SARIJO 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 
Table 1: Jemaah Islamiyah Binary Relations demonstrates the binary relations 
between the individuals within the Bali cell. This table illustrates merely whether a 
relation did or did not exist during the covert period. Table 2: Jemaah Islamiyah 
Interactional Criteria Applied, demonstrates the strength of the relations between the 
individuals, with a score of one signifying the weakest relationship such as a single 
text message or a financial transaction, and five signifying the strongest relationship 
such as individuals who resided together, or individuals who had numerous weak 
contacts over the period in question. 
 
TABLE 2. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH: INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED 
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MUKLAS 0 2 2 1 1 5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
AMROZI 2 0 0 2 0 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IMRON 2 0 0 3 5 3 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 5 
SAMUDRA 1 2 3 0 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 
DULMATIN 1 0 5 2 0 2 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 5 
IDRIS 5 4 3 5 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
MUBAROK 0 5 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AZAHARI 1 0 5 2 5 2 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 
GHONI 1 0 5 2 5 2 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 5 
ARNASAN 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 
RAUF 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 
OCTAVIA 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 
HIDAYAT 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 
JUNAEDI 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 
PATEK 1 0 5 2 5 2 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 
FERI 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
SARIJO 1 0 5 2  2 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 
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2.2.1 GRAPHS - VISUALIZATION 
A sociograph is a visual representation of a network developed through graph theory 
with the actors represented by nodes, and their relationships represented by links or 
lines. Sociogramatical analysis originated through ‘Gestalt’ theory in psychology, 
principally through the work of Kohler61 in 1925, and was developed through group 
dynamics approaches. This theory was later developed through the work of Moreno62 
and Lewin,63 who developed the sociogram and sociometric analysis. The method was 
refined through Harvard structuralists, principally Harrison White and his students 
through the 1960s.64 Graph 1 illustrates more clearly the communication, interaction, 
and structure of the cell. This graph was constructed through the use of UCInet 
Version 6.85,65 using the tabulated relational data presented in Table 2. 
 
2.3 STAGE 3: NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS 
The analysis within this framework entails seven structural criteria that will be used in 
the analysis, these are:  
1. Size;  
2. Density;  
3. Degree of Connexion; 
4. Centrality;  
5. Closeness;  
6. Betweenness,  and; 
7. Clusters.  
 
2.3.1 SIZE 
Size can be defined generally as the number of nodes within a network or data set. 
Boissevain describes the size measure as the “most important structural criterion of 
a…network…this is because the other criteria are calculated as a proportion of the 
total possible or actual links in the network”.66 This measure was limited in this 
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project through the network being limited to actors within the terrorist cell or those 
involved with terrorist activities in association with the cell. This strict procedure for 
the inclusion of members in the network aims to limit the fuzzy boundaries of covert 
networks discussed by Sparrow previously. These limitations of size allowed for the 
analysis of the cell itself, and not extend to the group’s wider terrorist networks.viii 
 
2.3.2 DENSITY 
Density is described as the “the average proportion of lines incident with nodes in the 
graph”,67 or “the extent to which links that could possibly exist among persons do in 
fact exist”.68 The use of density can indicate how covert a cell is, for example, Krebs’ 
analysis shows that the September 11 cell had a low density, implying that the 
removal of a node is less likely to compromise the rest of the network. As discussed, 
low density networks are not as efficient as networks of high density. Density is 
measured by the following equation:69 
 
L 
D =
g(g-1) / 2 
 
In this equation: D is density; L is the total number of lines present; and g is the total 
number of nodes within the network. 
 
2.3.3 DEGREE OF CONNEXION 
This criterion allows the measure of the average number of relations each member has 
with other members of the network.70 This criterion can qualify the results of density 
                                                 
viii Such measures also ensure that the focus and length criticisms of case studies are abided by.  
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equations, and allow further comparative analysis between networks. The degree of 
connexion (d) is calculated by: 
2L 
d = 
g 
 
2.3.4 ACTOR LEVEL DEGREE CENTRALITY 
Actor level degree centrality is the level at which a node is accessible to the persons in 
the network. Centrality is affected not only by the size of a network, but by the 
formation and shape of the network.71 This measure assists the analyst to identify the 
leaders within networks, this does not entail that they necessarily hold the power in 
the relationships or indeed the network, however an individual’s centrality indicates a 
critical importance within the network. The equation for the calculation of centrality 
is presented by Faust and Wasserman is:72 
 
 CD(ni) = di(ni) 
 
In this equation: CD(ni) is the Degree of Actor Level Centrality Index for node ‘i’; 
di(ni) is the degree of node ‘i’.ix The higher the value of CD(ni), the more central that 
individual is. In order to have the ability to compare the different centrality indexes, 
the result of this equation, CD(ni), will be standardised to a percentage or proportion.x 
The equation for the standardised actor level centrality index is: 
 
C’D(ni) = di(ni) 
                                                 
ix This ‘degree’ simply equates to the number of links the individual node possesses. 
x The standardization of results was devised by Beauchamp in 1965. 
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g-1 
 
2.3.5 ACTOR LEVEL CLOSENESS CENTRALITY 
Closeness is a criterion applied to the individuals within a network, and describes how 
close an actor is to others in the network, or the ability of actors within a network to 
access others.73 The equation for closeness is presented below, and was developed by 
Sabidussi in 1966.74 
1
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In this equation, CC (ni) is the ‘Actor Level Closeness Centrality Index’, g is the total 
number of actors within a network, and d(ni, nj) represents the geodesic distance 
between node ‘i’ and node ‘j’. The result of this equation, CC (ni), is then multiplied 
by (g-1), to give a standardised result as a percentage. 
 
2.3.6 ACTOR LEVEL BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY 
Betweenness is another measure of an individual’s activity/ability within a network, 
measuring the ability to control the flow of information within a network. The 
equation for the calculation for betweenness, developed by Freeman in 1977,75 is: 
∑
<
=
kj jk
ijk
iB g
ng
nC
)(
)(  
 
In this equation CB(ni) is the ‘Actor Level Betweenness Centrality Index’ for node ‘i’, 
gjk is the number of geodesies linking nodes ‘j’ and ‘k’, and gjk(ni) is the number of 
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geodesies linking the two actors that include the node ‘i’. This equation calculates the 
probability that node ‘i’ will be between an interaction between the other nodes within 
the network. Once again, CB(ni) is standardised to a percentage, C’B(ni), 
(‘Standardised Actor Level Betweenness Centrality Index’) by:76 
 
C’B(ni) = CB(ni)/[(g-1)(g-2)/2] 
 
2.3.7 CLUSTERS 
Clusters are simply areas of a network with a higher density in relation to other areas 
or cliques within the network.77 
 
3. ANALYSIS – JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 2002 BALI CELL 
The following results have been synthesised from Table 3 and Table 4 that illustrate 
the relationships between the members of the JI cell between the 6th and the 11th of 
October 2002 using the equations and measurements presented above. 
 
TABLE 3. OVERALL STRUCTURAL CRITERIA 
 CELL SIZE DENSITY DEGREE OF CONNEXION 
Score 18 43.382% 6.941 
 
 
The size of the JI Bali cell was 17, a large cell, perhaps unnecessarily so, with at least 
four individuals not playing any involvement in the operation. Figure 1 does indicate 
through the size of the cell, and the roles that each of the members played, that 
contingency plans were available, were the cell to be disrupted. These contingency 
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roles were taken up by Team Lima (excluding Arnasan) and Amrozi and Mubarok. 
These individuals were in place to take over any unskilled roles (mixing/packing 
chemicals, driving, surveillance, making purchases, or suicide bombingxi) that were 
vacated through other members being compromised, falling ill, or backing out of the 
operation. As the graph demonstrates, these individuals were kept significantly 
isolated from the rest of the group. 
TABLE 4: RANKED CENTRALITY MEASURES 
 CENTRALITY 
(standardised) 
BETWEENNESS 
(standardised) 
CLOSENESS 
(standardised) 
SAMUDRA 93.750 50.972 94.118 
IDRIS 62.500 5.139 72.727 
MUKLAS 56.250 1.944 69.565 
ALI IMRON 56.250 1.389 69.565 
DULMATIN 56.250 1.389 69.565 
AZAHARI 56.250 1.389 69.565 
PATEK 56.250 1.389 69.565 
GHONI 56.250 1.389 69.565 
SARIJO 56.250 1.389 69.565 
FERI 37.500 0.000 48.485 
ARNASAN 31.250 0.000 57.143 
JUNAEDI 31.250 0.000 57.143 
ABDUL RAUF 31.250 0.000 57.143 
OCTAVIA 31.250 0.000 57.143 
HIDAYAT 31.250 0.000 57.153 
                                                 
xi This last role was reserved for the members of Team Lima. 
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AMROZI 25.000 0.278 55.172 
MUBAROK 18.750 0.000 53.333 
 
The density of the cell was 43.382%, which indicates a mix between efficiency and 
covertness. This density score is largely due to the two all-channel clusters of Team 
Lima (Octavia, Arnasan, Junaedi, Hidayat, Rauf, and Samudra) and the bomb 
construction team at the Jalau Manjangan Street house (Patek, Imron, Azahari, 
Dulmatin, Ghoni, and Feri). These clusters were necessary, at least in the case of the 
Manjangan house, as the precise and time efficient construction of the explosive 
devices required heavy coordination and efficiency. Measures were taken within this 
cluster to attempt to counter the low levels of covertness that this density created. All 
individuals were operating under aliases, using mobile phones to communicate with 
individuals outside the cluster, and above all, these members never left the house 
(with the one exception following the explosion inside the garage). Due to the 
reasonably high (43.328%) density score, the cell was less covert. This would suggest 
that the exposure or detection of one of the members by authorities, while not making 
a significant impact on the cell’s overall efficiency and operation, would run the risk 
of exposing multiple members of the cell, especially if that member was in the 
Manjangan residence. This observation is supported by the high degree of connexion 
score of the cell, 6.941, that the exposure of one node within the cell could potentially 
lead to almost seven other nodes, and from these nodes the entire cell would be 
exposed. 
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From Table 4, it is clear that Samudra was the most central and active individual 
within the network, with the highest ability to access others, and the greatest control 
over the flow of information in the network. The most significant aspect of this 
finding is that by a significant margin, Samudra had the greatest ability to access the 
other individuals within the network. This result was exclusively due to his 
connection to Team Lima, and the suicide bomber Arnasan. While this cluster did not 
have a major role to play in the operation (Arnasan excluded), they were the backup 
for the operation, had anything gone wrong. Samudra’s centrality scores are further 
evidenced by the Figure 1 in which Samudra resembles the hub in a star network. 
 
Idris, in his role as logistics commander, yielded high centrality scores also, however 
these were not as significant as those of Samudra. The cell was quite centralised 
overall, with the members of the Palau Manjangan residence (bomb construction 
team) seemingly the centre of the operation. The lowest centrality scores were 
reserved for the contingency members who were kept to the periphery except when 
called upon for assistance. Mubarok had the lowest scores as he was kept very 
isolated and did not play any significant part in this stage of the operation. 
 
3.1 FINDINGS 
This analysis of the 2002 JI Bali bombing cell between October 6 and October 11, 
2002, or the cell’s ‘Covert Stage’, uncovered four main findings. The first finding is 
that Samudra and Idris were the most important individuals within the cell, 
specifically due to their high centrality scores. The second finding is that the high 
density and degree of connexion scores indicated the cell had a higher focus on 
efficiency and was less covert. This structural integrity would allow the group to 
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recover from the loss of one or even two members, with only the loss of some 
efficiency. However, if this loss was through the compromise of a node by a counter-
terrorism authority, the high density and degree of connexion would rapidly lead to 
the identification of a majority of the cell. The third finding is that Samudra was the 
weakest point in the cell, and his capture would possibly have led to the isolation of 
Team Lima (which included the suicide bomber and contingency nodes) and the loss 
of the most active and centralised member of the network. It is important to note 
however, that covert networks have the ability to heal themselves in the event of the 
loss of a node. It is most likely that Idris would have been able to accommodate 
Samudra’s role in the operation, in the event of this loss, reconnecting a link with 
Team Lima. With this in mind, the removal of both Samudra and Idris from the 
network would remove the two most important nodes within the network, and we can 
assume, would isolate the main group from the suicide bomber Arnasan, as well as the 
cluster in position to replace such individuals, damaging the cell to a almost 
inoperable state. The final finding is that the visit of Muklas to Bali unnecessarily 
involved a high ranking member, and was operationally unsound, however, it could 
have been justified by motivational and unification purposes that were required at this 
stage following disagreements and arguments among the cell members. 
 
3.2 APPLICATIONS 
The social network analysis of the JI Bali bombing cell of 2002 measured the level of 
each cell member’s activity, ability to access others, and the control over the flow of 
information within the network. The analysis also assessed the overall group’s 
orientation towards either efficiency or covertness, and identified the group’s leaders 
or most valuable nodes, as well as the dense clusters, and the weaknesses within the 
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network. From the identification of these criteria, specific counter-terrorism 
applications can be constructed, such as the identification and targeting of dense areas 
of the network for maximum exposure and compromise, or alternatively targeting 
critical points in the network to sever connections between clusters or other sections 
of a network. This is the most valuable aspect of social network analysis, the 
method’s visualization and mathematical measures allows the analyst to evaluate the 
best responses and tactics in attempting to disrupt the cell to the point at which it is no 
longer able to function. 
 
While this analysis has provided important insight into the 2002 JI Bali cell, further 
applications that can be drawn from this analysis, when attempting to predict how 
future JI cells would operate. Firstly, the JI cell would make preparations outside or in 
a remote area of the country of intended operation, and enter the major city or target 
area as a compartmentalized network consisting of several very dense or all-channelxii 
clusters focusing on efficiency and work as quickly as possible to complete the 
preparations and disperse before the implementation of the operation took place. 
These sections would be linked by the field commander or logistics commander. For a 
cell that does no have an extremely high level of covertness, such preparations would 
almost certainly have to take place in an area where members of JI could remain 
inconspicuous; this is particularly relevant for a JI cell operating in a Western nation, 
particularly Australia. As we saw with Samudra in the Bali operation, such a cell 
would have one or two high ranking members, who would be the most central and 
important nodes within the network (controlling the communication between sections 
of the network), constituting structurally weak points. As well as Samudra and Idris, 
                                                 
xii Areas of a network with 100% density (every member interacts with every other member). 
 27
the Bali cell used high ranking individuals such as Muklas. Following the rise and rise 
of JI’s infamy from December 2000xiii to October 2005,xiv such high ranking 
individuals may be used in the initial stages of planning, but not in the covert stage of 
the operation. Were the group to operate in a Western nation, they would certainly be 
smaller than the Bali cell, and the group would use local contacts to assist the cell 
members in the initial stages of the operation (as the group did in Bali). These 
individuals would be employed for local knowledge and the acquisition of resources 
locally. This finding encourages the continual surveillance of individuals known to 
have trained or associated with groups such as JI in both South East Asia and Western 
nations. 
 
Further social network analysis needs to be conducted on subsequent JI cells such as 
the 2003 Jakarta Marriott bombing cell, the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing cell, 
and the 2005 Bali bombing cell, to increase the understanding of JI’s covert network 
formations. It appears that subsequent operations resemble the network characteristics 
of the 2002 Bali cell in that the bomb was constructed (most likely by a dense cluster) 
close to the target area after the chemicals were transported from other areas, and that 
the field commander and logistics commander were on hand to witness the results. 
Following the many arrests resulting from the Bali bombing, Azahari became the field 
commander of operations, and Noor Din Mohammed Top became the logistics 
commander or chief strategist. Further research many identify a template JI formation, 
which will allow powerful predictive applications.xv 
 
                                                 
xiii The Christmas Eve bombings. 
xiv The 2005 Bali bombing. 
xv This is not unfeasible, as the operations are conducted by individuals with the same training and 
indoctrination (Afghanistan and Mindanao), and are often planned and executed by the same 
individuals. 
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The use of social network analysis in this article has aimed at identifying and 
analysing the major structural and interactional features of a JI cell. This 
comprehension is necessary in the countering of JI operations both in South East Asia 
and Australia. While a single analysis of one of many historical JI cells will not 
provide a succinct structural map of how future JI cells will operate, it does provide 
significant insight and understanding into the operation of the group. Further studies 
of such operations are encouraged by the author. While the use of social network 
analysis looking at historical groups is capable of providing some levels of 
predicability and foresight, the method is at its most powerful when employed in real 
time, allowing the clear visualization of the interactional, communicational and 
structural cohesion of an operational cell, bestowing the analyst with a potent weapon 
of prediction in the fight against terrorism, and the ability to evaluate the best and 
most effective methods of disruption against a terrorist cell. 
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